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Strategic Effects on StatedPreferences forPublicGoods:ATheoretical
 
and Experimental Analysis of the Contingent Valuation Survey
 
By Koichi Kuriyama＊
Strategic behavior of stated preferences in contingent valuation（CV）survey
 
is analyzed.CV is one of environmental valuation methods based on the survey
 
data and it asks about the respondents’willingness to pay（WTP）or willing-
ness to accept compensation（WTA）for the environmental change in question.
Economic models of dichotomous choice with follow-up open-ended question
 
are developed. While the respondents can report their preferences freely in the
 
open-ended（OE）format, they can make a choice between “yes”or “no”for
 
the offered payment scheme in dichotomous choice（CE）format. Theoretical
 
analysis shows that truth-telling is optimal strategy for first DC question,
however, free-riding is optimal for follow-up OE question.Furthermore strate-
gic downward bias of follow-up responses is effected by the number of players
 
and offered payment. Experimental CV survey data is stated preferences for
 
protecting the landscape of Kushiro wetland National Park in Hokkaido,Japan.
Experimental results of CV survey show that WTP estimated by follow-up OE
 
responses is significantly lower than WTP estimated by DC responses, and
 
offered payment has positive effects on follow-up OE responses.These empirical
 
results are compatible with the results from theoretical analysis
 
Keywords: strategic behavior,contingent valuation,incentive compatibility,
experimental survey analysis
 
1. Introduction
 
Public policy decision-making  often
 
requires an evaluation of the demand for
 
public goods,which often have no market
 
price.It is possible to measure preference
 
for public goods by directly asking people
 
to value them, but the preference data
 
from direct questioning may be suspect.
People engaged in strategic behavior may
 
overstate or understate their preference
 
for public goods（Samuelson,1954).Mech-
anism design theory shows that it is impos-
sible to design an incentive-compatible
 
response format that allows for more than
 
a binary response if no restrictions are
 
placed on individuals’preferences（Gib-
bard, 1973;Satterthwait, 1975). Experi-
mental economists have tested for strate-
gic effects in stated preferences for public
 
goods in a laboratory setting. For exam-
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ple, Bohm（1972）compared the strategic
 
effects of willingness to pay for television
 
programs between samples with different
 
incentive schemes and his experimental
 
results show no significant difference.
Other experiments are summarized in
 
Ledyard（1995).
In the field of environmental economics,
contingent valuation（CV）has tradition-
ally been used to estimate the value of
 
environmental resources（Mitchell  and
 
Carson, 1989). CV is one of several envi-
ronmental valuation methods based on
 
survey data;it asks respondents about
 
their willingness to pay（WTP）or will-
ingness to accept compensation（WTA）
for the environmental change in question.
There are some differences between CV
 
based on survey data and that based on the
 
laboratory experiments of experimental
 
economics;however, the experimental
 
approach of CV is very similar to experi-
mental economics（Fox et al., 1998;Har-
rison,2002).
Some elicitation methods have been
 
developed in CV studies including open-
ended, bidding game, payment card, and
 
dichotomous choice questions. While the
 
respondents can report their preferences
 
freely in the openended（OE）format,they
 
can only make a choice between “yes”or
“no”for the payment offered in the di-
chotomous choice（DC）format. Hoehn
 
and Randall（1987）showed that the DC
 
format can be incentive compatible under
 
some conditions. Carson et al.（1999）
summarized incentive structures of elicita-
tion methods in CV.Many previous studies
 
on contingent valuation surveys compared
 
between dichotomous choice（DC）and
 
open-ended（OE）methods .These studies
 
suggest that willingness to pay estimated
 
by the DC method tends to be larger than
 
that by the OE method. Cameron et al.
（2002）reported that the DC/OE willing-
ness to pay ratio generally seems to range
 
between 1.1 and 5 in previous studies.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze
 
the strategic behavior demonstrated in CV
 
survey data. The incentive structure of
 
dichotomous choice with a follow-up,
open-ended（DC＋OE）question format is
 
analyzed using theoretical models and
 
experimental studies. Section 2 provides
 
the theoretical models of the DC＋OE for-
mat. Theoretical analysis will show that
 
the optimal strategy for respondents in the
 
first DC format might be truthtelling,but it
 
leads to free-riding in the follow-up OE
 
question.Furthermore, strategic behavior
 
in follow-up OE responses will be effected
 
by the payment offered in the first DC
 
question. Section 3 describes the experi-
mental design used in the empirical analy-
sis. The target of our CV survey is to
 
analyze the strategic effects in stated pref-
erences for protection of the landscape of
 
the Kushiro Wetland National Park in
 
Hokkaido, Japan. Empirical results are
 
shown in section 4.Finally,section 5 pro-
vides concluding comments.
2. Models
 
2.1. The government and players
 
The government needs to know public
 
preferences for public goods. The status
 
quo of the public good is??and the gov-
ernment has a plan to improve this public
 
good to level??.The cost of improvement
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 is ?. The government offers a tax,?＝
??, on ? players, and the government
 
estimates their bids ??? from players’
responses.The government supplies these
 
public goods when aggregate bids are
 
more than the cost?∑
?
?????
Assume that the utility function of
 
player i is expressed as???,??where??
is the income of player?,and??is continu-
ous and non-decreasing in? and?.True
 
willingness to pay??????for improving
??to??is defined by
????,??＝????,??－????? ⑴
Player ?considers that other players’
bids are distributed as???＝???＋εwhere
εis an error term.Then player?’s objec-
tive probability of approving the improve-
ment of public goods is as follows:
Pr?approval?＝Pr?∑
?
?????
＝Pr???－1????＋??＞?T?
＝Pr??ε?
??－???????－1 －???
?
?
＝1－???
??－???????－1 －???
?
? ⑵
where? is the cumulative density function
 
ofε.
2.2. Dichotomous Choice Format
 
A single dichotomous choice（DC）ques-
tion between two alternatives is one of the
 
most commonly used preference elicitation
 
formats in contingent valuation studies.In
 
the DC format,the government offers pub-
lic policy???,??and a player’s response is
 
only“Yes”or“No”.The government cal-
culates a player’s bid from the relationship
 
between the suggested tax and the
 
response.When the response is yes, then
 
player ?’s bid calculated by the govern-
ment is????,??,otherwise it is????,??,
where ????,??＞????,??. Then, from
 
the characteristics of the monotonically
 
increasing cumulative density function???
1－???
??－???,???????????－1 －???
?
?
?1－???
??－???,??????????－1 －???
?
? ⑶
This means that player ?’s objective
 
probability of policy approval when saying
“Yes”is higher than“No”.
The bid estimated by the governments
 
may not be equal to the true willingness to
 
pay of a player because of the player’s
 
strategic behavior.Assume that the player’s
 
response is designed to maximize their
 
expected utility. The expected utility of
 
player?is
?????
＝????,?????
??－???,???????????－1 －???
?
?
＋????,??－????1－?
?
?
??－???,???????????－1
－?????
?
? ⑷
if the player accepts the suggested tax.If
 
the player rejects it,the expected utility is
?????
＝????,?????
??－???,??????????－1 －???
?
?
＋????,??－????1－?
?
?
??－???,??????????－1
－?????
?
? ⑸
Then,player?says yes when her expect-
ed utility of saying yes ???????is higher
 
than of saying no???????.This condition is
?????－??????0
⇔?????,??－??－????,???
????
?
?
??－???,??????????－1 －???
?
?
－???
??－???,???????????－1 －???
?
?
?
??0
⇔????,??－??－????,???0 ⑹
This means that the player’s optimal
 
strategy is truth telling.Player?says yes
 
when the suggested tax is lower than her
 
WTP,and otherwise says no.Thus,the DC
 
format is incentive compatible.This result
 
is similar to that of Hoehn and Randall
（1987).
2.3. Dichotomous Choice with a Follow-
up Open-Ended Question
 
Assume that players are asked their
 
willingness to pay for a policy after a
 
dichotomous choice question.This follow-
up question is open-ended（OE):players
 
can report their bids freely.Assume that
 
the payment of player?is the stated bid,
??,rather than the suggested tax,?.Then,
the utility maximization problem of player
?is
Max
??
????,?????
??－???????－1 －???
?
?
＋????,??－????1－?
?
?
??－???????－1 －???
?
?
?
?⑺
The first order condition is as follows
????,??－??－????,??
＝?1－???????????,??－???????????? ?
?－1????????0 ⑻
where?is the density function ofε.This
 
means that player?’s stated bid is less than
 
her true WTP:????W???. Note that
 
equation ⑻ is hold regardless other
 
players’bids,therefore,the dominant strat-
egy is the understate in follow-up OE.
Furthermore, a player’s stated bid, ??＝
????,??,?,??,??,is effected by the num-
ber of players,?,and the suggested tax,?.
The strength of the strategic effects caused
 
by the number of players and suggested
 
tax depends on the functional form of the
 
utility function and the objective probabil-
ity function. These results produce the
 
following proposition:
Proposition
 
In dichotomous choice with a follow-up
 
open-ended question, the first  di-
chotomous choice question is incentive
 
compatible,but strategic players’follow-
up bid is less than their true willingness
 
to pay. The follow-up response has a
 
strategic downward bias that is affected
 
by the number of players and the tax
 
suggested in the dichotomous choice
 
question.
3. Experimental Design
 
The data comes from a contingent valua-
tion survey of the Kushiro Wetland
 
National Park in Hokkaido, Japan. The
 
National Park covers 26,861 hectares and
 
is an important habitat for about 1,400
 
species of animals, 170 species of birds,
1,150 species of insects,and 600 species of
 
plants. This wetland has been declared
 
internationally significant under the Ram-
sar Convention of 1980.Over 600,000 peo-
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 ple visit the wetland annually, and other
 
recreational resources have been devel-
oped around the wetland.For example,18
 
golf courses are planned or under develop-
ment. Some people living in the Kushiro
 
area are concerned about the environmen-
tal effects of these recreational resources
 
on animal habitats. Therefore, conflicts
 
have arisen between nature conservation-
ists and resource developers in the Kushiro
 
wetland.
Our objective is to analyze strategic
 
effects in stated preferences for protecting
 
the landscape of the wetland.Two pictures
 
were shown to respondents:the status-quo
 
landscape of the Kushiro wetland and the
 
hypothetical landscape that might result
 
from change due to development around
 
the wetland. The payment vehicle was a
 
voluntary payment to a hypothetical“Wet-
land Protection Fund”.The description of
 
the payment scheme and hypothetical
 
change in the landscape were as follows:
Kushiro is rich in environmental
 
resources,but it is difficult to bequeath
 
these resources to future generations.
Consider a new fund, the Wetland
 
Protection Fund, which will be estab-
lished to protect this wetland.Figure 1
 
shows the landscape of the Kushiro
 
wetland. Assume that this landscape
 
will be changed to Figure 2 by develop-
ment around the wetland.
After describing  the hypothetical
 
appearance of the landscape, respondents
 
are asked their willingness to pay to pro-
tect the wetland landscape.The elicitation
 
method is a dichotomous choice with a
 
follow-up open-ended question?DC＋OE?.
Dichotomous Choice Question
 
Would you be willing to pay X yen per
 
year to protect the Kushiro wetland
 
landscape?（CIRCLE ONE NUM-
BER)
1. Yes
 
2. No
 
3. I don’t have to pay for a fund to
 
protect the environment
 
Follow-up Open-Ended Question
 
How much per year would you be
 
willing  to pay?（FILL IN THE
 
BLANK)
Yen per year
 
4. Experimental Results
 
We conducted a mole-intercept survey
 
on the general public in Sapporo in Octo-
ber 1995. The total sample surveyed was
 
845.While 81% of the respondents knew of
 
the wetland,only 36% of the respondents
 
had been to the Kushiro wetland. The
 
protest bid was 71 and the valid sample for
 
the choice experiment was 670. Table 1
 
shows a description and the mean value of
 
selected variables.For more details of this
 
survey,see Kuriyama（1998).
Assume that WTP can be expressed as
ln????＝??β＋η?,where??is a vector of
 
regressors and η?is an error term with
 
mean zero and varianceσ?.Because of the
 
incentive compatibility of the DC format,
respondent?answers ‘yes’when ln????
ln??????, and answers ‘no’ when
ln?????＜ ln???.When the error term is
 
assumed to be normally distributed,??0,σ
??), WTP can be estimated by a probit
 
model, and the probability of a yes
 response is as follows:
π?＝Pr?ln???? ln????
＝Pr??
ln???－??β???????σ?? ?
ε???σ??
?
? ⑼
＝1－Φ??
ln???－??β???????σ??
?
?
The log likelihood function for the data
 
of DC answers is
???＝∑
?
???π?＋???1－π??? ⑽
where??and??are dummy variables,??
＝1if the response is yes and??＝0other-
wise;and??＝1 if the response is no and
??＝0otherwise.
It is assumed that the follow-up open-
ended（OE）response,??,can be expressed
 
as ln??＝??β＋???,??＋μ,where s is the
 
strategic effect, which is affected by the
 
number of players and the suggested tax,
andμis the
 
normally distributed error term ??0,σ???.
Then the log likelihood function of the
 
follow-up OE question is as follows:
???＝∑
?
?
?－
1?2ln?2πσ???
－?ln??－??β－???,???????????????2σ??
?
? ?
Then,following Boyle et al.（1996),the
 
joint log likelihood function of the DC data
 
and the OE data can be expressed as fol-
lows
???????β,?,σ??,σ???
＝????β,σ???＋????β,?,σ??? ?
For comparison, we analyzed five
 
models.Model 1 uses only DC data,which
 
has no strategic effect.Model 2 uses only
 
follow-up OE data,and assumes no strate-
gic effect????,??＝0?.Model 3 uses only
 
follow-up OE data,but it includes strategic
 
bias that is effected by the suggested tax
????,??＝β?????.Model 4 uses joint esti-
mation of the dichotomous choice and
 
follow-up open-ended question, and
 
assumes no strategic effect.Model 5 uses
 
joint estimation and includes strategic
 
effects????,??＝β????ln?＋β????????.
Table 2 shows the results of estimations
 
under maximization of the likelihood func-
tion.AGE indicates the respondent’s age,
and has a significant positive influence on
 
a respondent’s WTP. KNOWECOSYS-
TEM is a dummy variable for respondents
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 who know the word “ecosystem”.LAND-
SCAPE is a dummy variable for respon-
dents who think that the wetland land-
scape is important. As expected, LAND-
SCAPE has a positive sign.WILDERNESS
 
is a dummy for respondents who think that
 
wetland wilderness is important. NOT
 
RESIDUAL is a dummy for respondents
 
who think that people cannot live in the
 
wetland,and it has a negative sign.
For the strategic effects, LOGT is the
 
log of the suggested tax in the DC question.
From the theoretical analysis in Section 2,
the strategic response in the follow-up
 
question might be affected by the suggest-
ed tax.In both model 3 and model 5,LOGT
 
is significant. CONSTANT is a constant
 
part of the strategic effects????,???in the
 
follow-up response and it has negative
 
sign. When the estimated parameters of
 
DC and the follow-up OE data are compar-
ed,the likelihood ratio test indicates signif-
icant difference between model 1 and
 
model 2?χ?＝12.5,significant at?＜ .05).
Table 3 shows the median of the willing-
ness to pay estimated by these models.The
 
numbers in brackets are 95% confidence
 
intervals, which are obtained using the
 
method of Krinsky and Robb（1986),and
 
based on 4,000 random draws. While the
 
WTP of the dichotomous choice question
 
is 2059 yen, the WTP of the follow-up
 
openended question is 1649 yen.The WTP
 
in the joint model with strategic effects
（model 5）is 2087 yen.This is not signifi-
cantly different from the WTP of the di-
chotomous choice data, but it is signifi-
cantly different from the WTP of the
 follow-up open-ended data. These results
 
indicate that the WTP estimated by the
 
data of the followup open-ended response
 
is significantly lower than the WTP esti-
mated by the data of the dichotomous
 
choice response,as expected by our theo-
retical analysis.
5. Discussion
 
We analyzed the strategic effects on
 
stated preferences of dichotomous choice
 
with a follow-up open-ended CV survey.
Theoretical analysis shows that strategic
 
players may understate the follow-up
 
open-ended responses, and the effects on
 
follow-up OE response of a suggested pay-
ment in DC format can be regarded as
 
strategic behavior. The experimental
 
results of the CV survey data show that
 
WTP estimated by follow-up OE responses
 
is significantly lower than WTP estimated
 
by DC responses,and suggest that payment
 
has positive effects on followup OE
 
responses. These empirical results are
 
compatible with the results from theoreti-
cal analysis, and strategic effects can be
 
one reason for this difference between the
 
WTP of the DC and of the follow-up OE
 
responses. However, it cannot reject the
 
possibility that the responses of DC may be
 
biased due to other reasons such as “yea
 
saying”（Cooper and Loomis, 1992;Kan-
ninen,1995).While our analysis focuses on
 
the strategic behavior of the responses in a
 
CV survey,stated preference data can be
 
affected by other sources of bias.Previous
 
CV studies have shown that stated prefer-
ence in CV survey data includes errors due
 
to  bias, including  scenario  mis-
specification, payment vehicle, implied
 
value cues,and so on（Carson,1991).More
 
experimental tests of the reliability and
 
validity of stated preferences in experi-
mental studies deserve further study.
Notes
 
Clarke（1971）and Groves（1973）show
 
incentive compatible mechanism with some
 
assumption of the restriction on individuals’
preferences.
Previous CV studies of the comparison
 
between DC and OE methods include Sellar et
 
al.（1985),Boyle and Bishop（1988),Johnson
 
et al.（1990),Walsh et al.（1992),Kealy and
 
Turner（1993), Kristrom（1993), McFadden
（1994), Boyle et al.（1996), Brown et al.
（1996), Schulze et al.（1996), Loomis et al.
（1997）and Cameron et al.（2002).
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